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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Lena Page contends the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress because its
analysis on her Fourth Amendment claim is contrary to the applicable law and because it did not
address her claim to suppress her statements under the Fifth Amendment. She also contended
the district court abused its discretion by not redlining the PSI when it concluded information
therein was not reliable, as it was contradicted by what the video showed.
Most of the State's arguments in response run contrary to State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162
Idaho 271 (2017), and its progeny.

For example, the record clearly disproves the State's

argument that Ms. Page did not preserve a Fifth Amendment challenge. (R., p.116 (Ms. Page
expressly invoking the Fifth Amendment in her final amended motion to suppress).) Therefore,
her argument - that her motion to suppress her unwarned statements should have been addressed
and granted under the rule articulated in Miranda 1 - was exactly the sort of polishing up of a
position taken below that is permitted on appeal under Garcia-Rodriguez.
The same is true of her argument for redlining the PSI. She requested the information be
corrected below, and the district court agreed it was not reliable. As such, her argument that the
district court needed to redline that information is properly made on appeal under GarciaRodriguez.

Contrarily, the State's main argument - that Ms. Page should not be allowed to pursue
her conditional plea because she breached the plea agreement - is wholly improper under
Garcia-Rodriguez, as it is a new position taken for the first time on appeal. It is a particularly

problematic position for the State to try to take because the district court expressly stated in the

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1

order releasing Ms. Page from custody that, even if she breached the agreement, she would not
forfeit the conditional nature of her plea. (R., p.218.) Moreover, the prosecutor actually opted
for a different remedy below. Thus, not only is the State's argument a perfect example of what
Garcia-Rodriguez and its progeny have made clear the State cannot do, it is frivolous on its

merits.
The only issue in which the State did not make an argument contrary to GarciaRodriguez and its progeny was in regard to the Fourth Amendment violation. However, its

argument in that regard reads the caretaker exception to the warrant requirement in an overlybroad manner contrary to the limited way Idaho's courts have consistently applied that
exception.
For any or all of those reasons, this Court should reject the State's arguments and afford
Ms. Page relief in this appeal.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated m
Ms. Page's Appellant's Brie£

They need not be repeated m this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUES
I.

Whether this Court should reject the State's remedy argument, as it is raised for the first
time on appeal, is contrary to the position the prosecutor took below, is frivolous in light
of the record, and is inconsistent with the applicable law.

II.

Whether the district court erred by denying Ms. Page's motion to suppress since the
video of the encounter shows the troopers temporarily abandoned the mission of the
welfare check for two minutes, thereby unlawfully prolonging the warrantless detention.

III.

Whether the district court erred by failing to address Ms. Page's motion to suppress the
unwarned statements she made during the encounter.

IV.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by not redlining objected-to portions of
the PSI that section even though the district court indicated it would not consider those
facts because they were not reliable.
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ARGUMENT
I.
This Court Should Reject The State's Remedy Argument, As It Is Raised For The First Time On
Appeal, Is Contrary To The Position The Prosecutor Took Below, Is Frivolous In Light Of The
Record, And Is Inconsistent With The Applicable Law

A.

The State's Breach Argument Is Frivolous Because, In Its Order Releasing Ms. Page To
Court Services, The District Court Specifically Noted That Ms. Page Would Not Forfeit
The Conditional Nature Of Her Plea Even If She Breached The Plea Agreement
Pleas are evaluated under the rules of contract law. State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 73

(2004). Under contract law, the parties may limit the nature ofremedies that will be available in
the event of a breach.

Doyle v. Ortega, 125 Idaho 458, 461 (1994).

If such a limit is

unambiguous, the parties are bound by it, which means other potential remedies are simply "not
available" to the non-breaching party. Id. at 461-62 (concluding "specific performance was not
available" to the buyer as a remedy for the seller's breach because the terms of the contract
clearly limited the buyer's remedy to a return of the earnest money).
The record in this case clearly reveals that the remedy of withdrawing consent to the
conditional nature of the plea was not available to the State under the terms of the agreement for
Ms. Page's presentence release. Most notably, the order releasing Ms. Page to Court Services on
her own recognizance expressly stated, "the Defendant reserves her right to appeal the
suppression issue, even

if she breaches the agreement." (R., p.218 (emphasis added).) This was

not a conclusion the district court pulled from thin air. The minutes of the hearing on Ms. Page's
motion for that release indicate it was part of an agreement reached between the parties:
[Defense Counsel] informs the Court that the State will stipulate to her being
released OR to CS w/ testing
[Prosecutor] concurs

4

Court grants motion, Def released OR to CS w/ testing, if she feels the jurisdiction
she will be responsible for extradition, if she violates release it will be a breach of
the agreement, Def reserves right to appeal suppression issue
(R., p.215 (emphasis added).)
That the agreement limited the available remedies in this manner is further demonstrated
by the fact that, at the sentencing hearing (held after the breach occurred), the prosecutor did not
object when defense counsel reminded the district court that "this is a conditional plea." (See
Tr., p.103, Ls.18-24.) The district court acknowledged that defense counsel's representation was
accurate. (See Tr., p.103, L.22.) In fact, the district court explained, without objection, that the
remedy which would actually be afforded to the State was that the prosecutors were "free to
make whatever recommendation they want." (Tr., p.104, Ls.8-17.)
The State has not acknowledged, much less challenged, any of these points on appeal.

(See generally Resp. Br.) That means the State's remedy argument on appeal is wholly frivolous
because these points reveal that, just like the remedy of specific performance was not available to
the buyer in Doyle, the remedy of withdrawing consent to the conditional nature of the plea was
not available to the State in this case. This Court should, therefore, reject the State's attempt to
claim that unavailable remedy for the first time on appeal.

B.

The State's Breach Argument Should Be Barred As A New Theory Presented Improperly
For The First Time On Appeal And Estopped Under Contract Law
This Court should also refuse to consider the State's remedy argument on appeal because

it is a new position, a new theory, which is not properly raised for the first time on appeal. The
Idaho Supreme Court has recently and repeatedly reaffirmed that a party cannot change positions
between the trial level and appeal, as doing so is "'manifestly unfair"' and "'would destroy the
purpose of an appeal,'" which is to review the decision based on the arguments actually

5

presented and ruled on below. State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017) (quoting Garcia-

Rodriguez, 162 Idaho at 276 (in tum quoting Smith v. Sterling, 1 Idaho 128, 131 (1867)));
accord, e.g., State v. Hoskins,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d _ , 2019 WL 2462693, *4 (June 13,
2019).

While a party may clean up its position on an issue for appeal by presenting new

arguments and authorities in support of that position, "these pragmatic evolutions do not leave
room for a party to raise new substantive issues on appeal or adopt a new position on an issue,"
as the State has done here. State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, _ , 439 P.3d 1267, 1270 (2019)
(emphasis added). The State has not mentioned any of this controlling authority, much less tried
to address how it impacts the argument is has presented on appeal. 2 (See generally Resp. Br.)
That this is a new position is demonstrated by the fact that the prosecutor actually elected
a different remedy below - being freed from its agreement to recommend a particular sentence.

(See Tr., p.75, Ls.7-12 (the original agreement under which the prosecutor agreed to recommend
a suspended sentence); compare Tr., p.99, Ls.8-12 (the prosecutor ultimately recommending the
district court retain jurisdiction); see also Tr., p.104, Ls.8-17 (the district court judge stating this
would be the remedy for the breach).) Since the prosecutor elected for that particular remedy,
the State cannot change its position on appeal and ask for a different or additional remedy
instead. Compare Hoskins, 2019 WL 2462693, *4 (holding that, where the State elects to argue
one exception to the warrant requirement below, it cannot, for the first time on appeal, argue a
different exception, particularly when it "possessed the opportunity, facts, and evidence to

2

This is not the first time the State has made such arguments without acknowledging GarciaRodriguez and its progeny. See State v. Islas,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d _ , 2019 WL 1053379,
*4 n.1 (Ct. App. 2019) (criticizing the State for taking a new position on an issue for the first
time on appeal without acknowledging these cases, and pointing out it had done the same thing
in State v. Hoskins, 2018 WL 4169337 (Ct. App. 2018), superseded on review by State v.
Hoskins,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d _ , 2019 WL 2462693 (June 13, 2019)), rev. denied.
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present this theory" but simply failed or chose not to do so); Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 721 (holding
that, where the State takes a particular action below ( in that case, conceding an argument), it
cannot take a directly contrary position on appeal).
The fact that the prosecutor elected a different remedy below also demonstrates that the
State's new remedy argument on appeal should also be barred by the contract-law principle of

quasi estoppel. That principle '"precludes a party from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a
right inconsistent with a position previously taken by him"' when the other party relies on that
decision. 3 Keesee v. Fetzek, 111 Idaho 360, 362 (Ct. App. 1986) (quoting KTVB, Inc. v. Boise

City, 94 Idaho 279, 281 (1971)). In Keesee, the Court of Appeals applied that rule directly to the
election of remedy - since the injured party elected a particular remedy for a breach, and the
breaching party relied on that election, the principle of quasi estoppel prevented the injured party
from subsequently seeking a different remedy for the breach. Id.; cf Phillips v. Gomez, 162
Idaho 803, 809 (2017) (holding that, where a party had pre-elected his remedy for a potential
breach and had actually availed himself of that remedy, "he foreclosed his ability" to seek an
alternative remedy); Doyle, 125 Idaho at 461-62 (holding a particular remedy was "not
available" to the injured party when the terms of the contract specifically limited the injured
party to a different remedy).
As discussed infra, the record reveals that the prosecutor accepted the limited remedy
available under the agreement for Ms. Page's presentence release. (See Tr., p.99, Ls.8-12; R.,

3

If there is no detrimental reliance, then the injured party may subsequently change positions.
Keesee, 111 Idaho at 361; accord Powell v. Nietmann, 116 Idaho 590, 594 (1989). However, the
injured party would still have to make that decision in the district court, as the Idaho Supreme
Court precedent is clear that a party cannot change positions and raise such a claim for the first
time on appeal, as the State has improperly done here. See, e.g., Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 721;
Ada County Highway Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, 141-42 (2017).
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pp.215, 218.) Ms. Page relied on the prosecutor's election of that remedy as she proceeded to
sentencing and filed the conditional appeal rather than pursuing other alternative options, such as
moving to withdraw her plea before the sentence was imposed. For example, if the prosecutor
had tried to withdraw consent to the conditional nature of the plea despite having previously
agreed that a breach by Ms. Page would not prevent her from challenging the denial of the
motion to suppress on appeal (see R., pp.215, 218), that may well have constituted just cause for
her to withdraw her plea. See State v. Sunseri, 165 Idaho 9, 13 (2018) (reaffirming the standard
for withdrawing a plea prior to sentencing is lower than trying to withdraw a plea after
sentencing, and the discretion to allow that should be liberally exercised). Alternatively, that
may have constituted a breach on the State's part, which could have also allowed Ms. Page to
rescind the plea agreement.
Since she forfeited those alternative options based on the prosecutor's election of a
particular remedy, the State, like the seller in Keesee, should be estopped from seeking a
different or additional remedy now, especially since the State is trying to change its position on
the remedy question for the first time on appeal.

C.

The State's New Proposed Remedy Is Improper Because It Asks This Court To
Retroactively Presume A Waiver Of Ms. Page's Right To Appeal When She Clearly Did
Not Intend Or Consent To Such A Waiver
Even if this Court considers the State's new remedy argument on appeal, it should reject

it on its merits because the State's invitation to treat the plea as though it were "rendered
unconditional" is improper. (See Resp. Br., p.5.) It is true that Idaho's courts have held that,
when a person breaches a plea agreement, the prosecutor is relieved of his obligations under the
plea agreement. E.g., Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 519 (1998). However, those decisions
focused on the agreement to recommend a particular sentence. See, e.g., id. The logic in that

8

regard does not extend to the agreement to consent to a conditional plea because, unlike an
agreement for a particular sentencing recommendation, an agreement for a conditional plea is
directly related to the defendant's decision of whether to waive her rights, specifically, her
statutory right to appeal.
A conditional plea is, at its core, an express statement that the defendant does not agree to
waive her right to appeal certain issues by pleading guilty. See State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883,
889 (2000) (explaining that, absent a specific provision making the plea conditional, a guilty plea
will be presumed to waive all non-jurisdictional defects, and by failing to make a plea
conditional, that waiver will be assumed). Therefore, what the State is asking this Court to do by
treating Ms. Page's plea as if it were "unconditional" is to retroactively presume a wavier which
Ms. Page clearly did not intend to make. Such a presumption would be improper.
As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained in this type of situation, "a waiver will not be
presumed or implied, contrary to the intention of the party whose rights would be injuriously
affected thereby unless, by his conduct, the opposite party was misled, to his prejudice, into the
honest belief that such waiver was intended or consented to." Grover v. Idaho Public Util.
C'mmn., 83 Idaho 351, 357-58 (1961) (internal quotation and alterations omitted); accord
State v. Padilla, 101 Idaho 713, 718 (1980) (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373

(1979)) ("'The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights."'). The State has
made no attempt to show that it was misled, much less prejudicially misled, into an honest belief
that Ms. Page intended or consented to a waiver of her right to appeal by her failure to appear at
the sentencing hearing. (See generally Resp. Br.) That is not surprising because the record
clearly demonstrates the State was not misled at all.

9

Specifically, following a hearing with the parties, the district court clearly stated in its
order releasing Ms. Page that a breach by her would not prevent her from challenging the
decision on the motion to suppress on appeal. (R., pp.215, 218.) In light of that discussion and
order, the State could not harbor an honest belief that Ms. Page intended or consented to waive
her appellate rights by breaching the plea agreement. That conclusion is reinforced by the fact
that the prosecutor did not object when, after the breach occurred, defense counsel reminded the
district court that this was still a conditional plea. (See Tr., p.103, Ls.18-24.) Since the State
was not honestly misled, this Court should not retroactively presume such a waiver. Grover, 83
Idaho at 357-58.
Put another way, as the United States Supreme Court has held, it is not proper to rewrite
the nature of the initial agreement when a breach occurs. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S.
129, 137 (2009). Rather, a remedy is fashioned to address the breach. Id. For example, a party
can request rescission or specific performance of the plea agreement if there is a breach. Id.
However, affording such remedies do not change the nature of what happened at the moment the
parties initially entered the agreement. Id.
As such, when the government breaches the plea agreement, the defendant does not get to
recast the initial agreement as being not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Id. By the same
logic, the State should not now be allowed to retcon4 the initial agreement to include a waiver of
rights that Ms. Page did not, nor ever intended to, make. See id. Therefore, even if this Court

4

The term "retcon" is an abbreviation for "retroactive continuity," and refers to a literary
device whereby the form or content of a previously-established narrative is changed in a way
that would otherwise be incompatible with the established narrative.
Merriam-Webster,
"Words We're Watching: A Short History of 'Retcon,"' available at https://www.merriamwebster.com/words-at-play/retcon-history-and-meaning (last accessed 7/31/19); accord
Cambridge Dictionary Online, available at https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/
english/retcon (last accessed 7/31/19).
10

considers the merits of the State's new argument on appeal, it should reject that argument
because it runs directly contrary to the applicable precedent. The proper remedy was the one
actually afforded by the district court - specific performance on Ms. Page's part with the State
relieved of its agreement to recommend a particular sentence.

II.
The District Court Erred By Denying Ms. Page's Motion To Suppress Since The Video Of The
Encounter Shows The Troopers Temporarily Abandoned The Mission Of The Welfare Check
For Two Minutes, Thereby Unlawfully Prolonging The Warrantless Detention

A.

The Video Evidence Shows A Detention Occurred In The Initial Moments Of The
Encounter Between The Officers And Ms. Page
The State's argument on the question of whether there was a seizure does not conduct the

relevant analysis.

To determine whether there was a seizure, the courts focus on whether a

reasonable person would have felt free to disregard the officer's questions and go about her
business. State v. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431, 434 (Ct. App. 2006). The State's suggestion - that
there was no detention because the officers had a potential safety rational to order Ms. Page to
"come with me" "over here for a sec." (See Resp. Br., pp.9-10) -misses that point entirely.
Even if the officers had a valid safety concern, if a reasonable person would not have felt free to
leave (which is another way the safety concern could be alleviated), then would still have been a
seizure. See Zuniga, 143 Idaho at 434. Thus, what the presence of the safety concern speaks to
is whether the seizure was reasonable, not whether there was actually a seizure in the first place. 5

5

It should be noted that the mere presence of a safety concern will not, ipso facto, make a
seizure reasonable. See, e.g., State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 662 (2007) (holding the officer's
alleged concern for his safety upon learning the person he had encountered was in possession of
a knife did not ultimately justify the seizure and search in that case).
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That is, ultimately, because the officer’s subjective intent is not relevant to whether a seizure
occurred. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
The totality of the circumstances in this case shows a reasonable person would not have
felt free to disregard Officer Ward’s instruction to “come with me” right after Officer Fortner
said to “take her back here for a sec.” After all, Officer Fortner had already displayed his control
of the situation, when he said something to Ms. Page in a manner that caused her to raise her
hands over her head and turn toward the car as if she were about to be frisked. (Exhibit A,
~11:52:35.) The State asserts that the conclusion that Officer Fortner was giving a command at
that point is merely speculation. (Resp. Br., p.9.) However, an evaluation of the totality of the
circumstances includes considering the reasonable inferences suggested by those circumstances.
See, e.g., State v. Rector, 144 Idaho 643, 646 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding the district court had
properly drawn a reasonable inference from the totality of the circumstances); State v. Jaborra,
143 Idaho 94, 98 (Ct. App. 2006) (same).

Given all the officers’ testimony about telling

Ms. Page to keep her hands out of her pockets (see Tr., p.21, Ls.18-25, p.25, Ls.6-18, p.26,
Ls.9-25, Tr., p.44, Ls.5-7, 17-20), and the fact that the video shows Ms. Page put her hands in
her pockets at that time (see Exhibit A, ~11:52:30), the reasonable inference from the totality of
the circumstances is that Officer Fortner was ordering her to keep her hands out of her pockets.
That demonstrates a detention occurred.
In this regard, the video speaks more clearly than any written description could. What
the video shows, in the way the encounter unfolded, a reasonable person in Ms. Page’s position
would not have felt free to ignore the officers’ instructions. (See generally Exhibit A.) The
video shows a warrantless detention, and thus, a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

12

B.

The Officers Delayed The Mission Of The Stop To See If Ms. Page Was In Immediate
Need Of Assistance To Investigate Other Potential Lines Of Criminal Conduct
The State's argument that there was no error because the seizure was reasonable at its

inception also misses the point of the issue raised on appeal because, even if it was reasonable at
the outset, the officers can still impermissibly delay the seizure by failing to pursue the mission
of that seizure. See Rodriguez v. United States,_ U.S._, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612, 1614-15
(2015) (noting the officer initiated the detention after seeing a violation of a state statute, before
determining the officer subsequently violated the defendant's rights by impermissibly extending
that detention). Ms. Page, like the defendant in Rodriguez, is not challenging the initial moment
of seizure, but rather, is arguing the officers impermissibly delayed that warrantless detention by
asking questions not related to the caretaking mission of the stop.
That the State failed to appreciate the issue actually on appeal is demonstrated by its
reliance on State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690 (Ct. App. 1999). In Mireles, the initial seizure was
justified by the caretaking function, but the officer did not pursue that mission of the stop
because, as he approached to check on the driver, he saw open beer bottles in the car. See id. at
691. At that point, the officer had reasonable suspicion to pursue a criminal investigation rather
than a caretaker investigation. See id. at 692-93. Therefore, Mireles is distinguishable from
Ms. Page's case because the prolonging of the detention in this case occurred before the officer
saw anything that might give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. 6

6

The district court did discuss various facts that arose during the course of the detention, such as
its fmding that Ms. Page was jittery and the testimony that she kept putting her hands in her
pockets despite the officer's directives, which it held gave rise to a reasonable suspicion, either
of criminal conduct or that she was armed and presently dangerous. (R., pp.181-83.) However,
as those facts were observed during the time the detention was being unlawfully prolonged while the officers were not pursuing the caretaking mission of the stop - they are tainted by
the constitutional violation, and so, cannot justify the detention. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at
1614-15.
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The totality of the circumstances of this case reveals the officers were not pursuing the
caretaking mission of this detention because their questions were not aimed at detecting whether
Ms. Page was suffering a medical emergency or otherwise in need of immediate assistance.
First, she was clearly not suffering a medical emergency. (See generally Exhibit A.) As a result,
none of the questions about whether she had anything to drink were relevant to the caretaking
mission of this detention because there was no indication she needed immediate medical
assistance. (Compare Resp. Br., p.8 (discussing how those questions could potentially relate to
medical conditions stemming from domestic violence, or intoxication).)

While it may be

possible to imagine a scenario where such questions would be permissible, the reasonableness
analysis under the Fourth Amendment is ultimately fact-specific. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S.
33, 39 (1996). As such, the potential that certain questions might possibly be related to possible
physical conditions does not demonstrate those questions were reasonable under the caretaking
exception in this case, particularly when the other circumstances show there was no obvious
medical emergency.
The State complains that Ms. Page is trying to read the caretaking exception in a limited
fashion. (Resp. Br., p.8.) That, however, is contrary to the applicable precedent, which is clear
that all exceptions to the warrant requirement are limited. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 208
(2009) (reiterating that “limited exceptions to the warrant requirement for intrusions that are
justified in the circumstances”) (internal quote omitted, emphasis added); State v. Magnum, 153
Idaho 705, 714 (Ct. App. 2012) (explaining the presumption against warrantless searches and
seizures “may be overcome only under limited, well-recognized exceptions”) (emphasis added).
If these exceptions are not limited, if they are not “few in number and carefully delineated,” they
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will swallow the rule and render the Fourth Amendment meaningless. State v. Curl, 125 Idaho
224, 225 (1993).
This is particularly true with the caretaking exception because it is particularly
susceptible to this sort of overreach. State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824, 54 P.3d 464, 467 (Ct.
App. 2002). (allowing the officers to do more than a welfare check “would present far too great
an opportunity for pretextual stops and far too great an imposition on the privacy interest of our
citizenry to comport with the Fourth Amendment”); see also State v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301,
304 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 104 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Osborne, 121
Idaho 520, 526 (Ct. App. 1991). The State’s assertion – that officers can ask questions related to
intoxication and domestic battery without any indication that there is a present emergency in
either respect – is precisely the type of overreach Maddox sought to prevent. Rather, the
caretaking exception is actually supposed to be applied in the limited manner Ms. Page has
described – it allows officers to address medical emergencies and other scenarios which require
immediate action, not to ask generalized questions about the person’s situation, and it certainly
does not allow them to ask questions about violations of criminal statutes without other
reasonable suspicion justifying it. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973);
Osborne, 121 Idaho at 526; see also Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615.
In this case, the officer’s questions were not designed to find out whether immediate
action was required to assist Ms. Page with a present medical emergency or a broken down car.
Therefore, those questions did not serve the purpose of the limited caretaking mission of this
particular detention.

As such, asking them departed from the mission of the warrantless

detention, and thereby delayed the detention in violation of Ms. Page’s Fourth Amendment
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rights. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614-15. As a result, all the evidence found during that
unlawfully pro longed detention should have been suppressed.

III.
The District Court Erred By Failing To Address Ms. Page's Motion To Suppress The Unwarned
Statements She Made During The Encounter
The State has offered no argument against the merits of Ms. Page's claim on appeal that
the district court erred by not addressing her claim to suppress the statements she made because
they were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. (See generally Resp. Br.) As such, it
has forfeited any argument in that regard. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996).
Rather, the State only advanced the factually-inaccurate argument that Ms. Page did not
raise a challenge under the Fifth Amendment, that she based her motion "exclusively upon the
Fourth Amendment." (Resp. Br., p.10.) As clearly revealed on page 116 of the Clerk's Record,
in her second and fmal amended motion to suppress, Ms. Page expressly made the following
argument: "Defendant further moves to suppress any and all statements made by the defendant
as they were fruits of an illegal detention, seizure and search and they were obtained in violation
of the Defendant's right against self incrimination guaranteed by the 5th and 6th Amendments to
the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution."

(R., p.116 (emphasis added).)

Therefore, she very clearly raised a claim under the Fifth Amendment in the district court.
One month before the State filed its brief in this case, the Court of Appeals held such an
argument was enough to preserve such an issue for appeal. State v. Chambers,_ Idaho,_,
_

P.3d _ , 2019 WL 1891005 (Apr. 29, 2019), petition for rev. pending. In Chambers, the

State argued that the defendant had failed to preserve a claim under the Sixth Amendment. Id. at
*8. The Court of Appeals disagreed, pointing out that he had "expressly argued that the alleged
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false allegation implicated his ‘constitutional right to present a defense and to confront witnesses
against him.’” Id. That, the Court of Appeal held, was sufficient to preserve the constitutional
claim for appeal. Id. Likewise, Ms. Page’s argument was sufficient to preserve her Fifth
Amendment claim for appeal.
Moreover, the Fifth Amendment issue was included within the conditional nature of her
plea. (Compare Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) The record is clear that the conditional plea preserved
Ms. Page’s right to appeal the decision denying her motion to suppress. (R., p.193 (in the guilty
plea questionnaire, Ms. Page identifying the “right to appeal denial of motion to suppress” as the
issue on which she was reserving her right to appeal); Tr., p.84, Ls.17-20 (same during the plea
colloquy); see also Tr., p.75, Ls.1-8 (defense explaining at the change of plea hearing that the
conditional plea was being made “in light of the Court’s decision on the motion to suppress”);
R., p.218 (the district court acknowledging Ms. Page “reserves her right to appeal the
suppression issue” even were she to breach the plea agreement).).) Since Ms. Page raised the
Fifth Amendment claim in her motion to suppress, and since the district court should have
granted that motion in regard to her statements, that issue was preserved by the conditional plea.
Finally, the fact that Ms. Page did not specifically identify Miranda as the applicable rule
below does not mean this is a new theory on appeal. (See Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) Rather,
presenting that additional authority in support of the position she staked out in her motion below
is precisely the sort of polishing up of an argument that is appropriate on appeal. Gonzalez, 439
P.3d at 1270; Ada County Highway Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, 141-42 (2017).
As such, Ms. Page’s argument to show that the district court erred in denying her motion to
suppress because her Fifth Amendment claim was, in fact, meritorious is properly presented in
this appeal.
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Since the State's only argument on this issue is completely frivolous in light of the law
and the record, it should be rejected. Accordingly, because the district court did not address
Ms. Page's Fifth Amendment claim below, this case should be remanded so that issue might
actually be addressed. Compare State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363 (Ct. App. 2000).

IV.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Redlining Objected-To Portions Of The PSI
That Section Even Though The District Court Indicated It Would Not Consider Those Facts
Because They Were Not Reliable
As it did with the Fifth Amendment issue, the State has only raised a disingenuous
procedural challenge to the issue about redlining the PSI. (See Resp. Br., pp.12-13.) By pointing
to the information in the "Official Version" section of the PSI in response to the district court's
question of whether "any corrections" were needed to the PSI, Ms. Page was, in fact, asking for
that information to be corrected. (Tr., p.92, L.11 - p.93, L.9.) Moreover, the district court agreed
that the information in the official version. (Tr., p.93, Ls.10-14.) The applicable legal standards
are clear that the mechanism by which a district court corrects unreliable information in a PSI is
by redlining it. E.g., State v. Carey, 152 Idaho 720, 722 (Ct. App. 2012). Therefore, Ms. Page's
polished-up argument on appeal- that the district court abused its discretion by not redlining that
information from the PSI - was preserved for appeal. See Gonzalez, 439 P.3d at 1270; Brooke
View, 162 Idaho at 141-42.

Put another way, the State's argument ignores the standard of review that is applicable
when reviewing a discretionary decision like this. One way in which the district court will abuse
its discretion is by making a decision which is inconsistent with the applicable legal standards.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018). Here, the district court agreed with

Ms. Page that the information in the "Official Version" section of the PSI was unreliable because
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it was contradicted by the video. (Tr., p.93, Ls.10-14.) The applicable legal standards make it
clear that, when a district court concludes that certain information in a PSI is unreliable or
incorrect, the district court is required to redline or remove that unreliable information. E.g.,
Carey, 152 Idaho at 722. Therefore, once the district court found the information in the “Official
Version” section to be unreliable because it was contradicted by the video, the district court was
obliged to redline or remove that unreliable information form the PSI. As such, Ms. Page can
properly argue the district court abused its discretion by not doing what the applicable legal
precedents clearly required it to do in that situation. See also State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 868
(2019) (reaffirming that, when it is clear the district court actually decided an issue, that issue is
properly addressed on appeal even though it might not have been “formally raised” to the district
court).
In fact, the State’s argument conspicuously ignores the district court’s decision in that
regard.

(See generally Resp. Br., p.13 (arguing that, because Ms. Page only presented

potentially-contradictory evidence, the district court could properly refuse to redline the PSI).)
When there is conflicting evidence, the district court is tasked with weighing that evidence and
determining which is more reliable. See State v. Bundy, 122 Idaho 111, 113 (Ct. App. 1992).
The district court exercised that authority in this case, determining the evidence Ms. Page had
presented was the more reliable evidence: “[I]t’s just the police report. The police report is the
police report.

I watched the video.

Just like what [defense counsel] said, I know what

happened.” (Tr., p.93, Ls.10-14 (emphasis added).) Therefore, this case does not, as the State
believes, involve an appellate assessment of contradictory information in the record; it involves
an assessment of the district court’s decision to not correct information it had found to be
actually unreliable. After all, the district court corrected other information Ms. Page challenged.
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(See generally PSI.) That only further reinforces that her challenge to its failure to do the same
with the information in the Official Version section is properly challenged on appeal. Since the
district court failed to take the action required once it made that determination, it abused its
discretion.
Either way, the question of the district court's failure to redline the Official Version
section of the PSI upon finding the information in that section was not reliable is properly raised
on appeal and this Court should grant Ms. Page relief for the uncontested reasons discussed in
the Appellant's Brief. (See App. Br., pp.19-21.)

CONCLUSION
Ms. Page respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying her motion to
suppress, vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this case for further proceedings.
Alternatively, she respectfully requests this Court remand this case so that the unreliable
information can be stricken from her PSI.
DATED this 1st day of August, 2019.
/ s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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